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SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSIONCOMMISSION MEMORANDUM TO THE COUNCIL
ON THE CO-ORDINATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES
AND MONETARY CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY
On 5 December 1968 the Commission submitted to the Council a Memorandum
on appropriate policy in the Community on current economic and monetary
problems . In accordance with the conclusions of this Memorandum, the Council
at a meeting on 12 December 1968
, "
recognized fhe need for fuller alignment of
economic policies in the Community and for an examination of the' scope for
intensifying monetary co-operation . The object of the present Memorandum is
to clarify the Commission s position on these two points.
I. Continuity of Commission recommendations
1. The Commission of the European Communities must point out first of all that
the steps advacated in this Memorandum are in line with the policy which the
Commission of the European Economic Community worked out and advocated
over a period of several years.
The main lines of this policy were set out in Chapter VIII (Monetary policy) of
the "Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Programme of the Community
for the Second Stage , of 24 October 1962, and in the Commission s publication
Initiative 1964" of 30 September 1964.
In the 1962 Memorandum, the Commission of the European Economic Community
affirmed that the co-ordination of the Member States' policies "would be incomplete
and therefore possibly ineffective, if no comparable action were taken in the field
of monetary policy It recommended, among other things, the creation of a
number of procedures for prior information and consultation, the establishment
of a common position with regard to external monetary relations, and the negoti-
ation of an agreement laying down "the extent of the obligations ... with regard
to mutual aid under the Treaty
2. In February 1968 the Commission of the European Communities submitted a
Memorandum on Community action in the monetary field at the conference of
Finance Ministers in Rome. This was done with the greatest discretion in view of
the nature of the problems to be dealt with. The Commission suggested that the
Committee of Governors of Central Banks and the Monetary Committee might
examine the following questions:
(i) The possibility of Member States undertaking to make no change in their
currency parities, except by common accord; parity changes would not be ruled
out completely, but as they are a matter of common interest under the Treaty of
Rome, this would involve first considering the possible impact on the Community
and seeking alternative solutions if necessary;
(ii) The elimination, for the currencies of the Member States, of day-to-day
fluctuations around the parities, and the adoption of identical ranges of fluctuation
in respect of non-member countries, not only to facilitate commercial and financial
relations within the Community, but also to make possible a common position for
the Member States should non-member countries adopt floating exchange rates;
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under Articles 108 and 109 of the Treaty, for example in the form of a multilateral
network of mutual credit rights which the institutions concerned could use when
needed;
(iv) The definition of a European unit of account which would be used in all fields
of Community action requiring a common denominator.
The Commission of the European Communities also recommended that, while
strengthening their internal monetary solidarity, the member countries should
declare their readiness to respect and uphold the principles of the international
monetary system as established in international agreements concluded since the
end of the Second World War, and to contribute to the effective operation of this
system through concerted action.
3. The Commission observes that it was not before the Finance Ministers' Con-
ference in Rotterdam on 9 and 10 September 1968 that the Monetary Committee
was given a mandate to continue its work, in co-operation with the Committee of
Governors of Central Banks, on progress to be made in the field of monetary
relations in the European Economic Community.
In the meantime, there were many developments, and events occurring in Novem-
ber 1968 led the Commission to refer to the Council and submit proposals. The
Commission considers that the disturbances of 1968 and the dangers which will
threaten the future of the Community if no action is taken compel its institutions
to define their position clearly. The Commission, which the Treaty entrusts with
responsibilities for the Community, would be failing in its duty if it did not iriform
the Council of its concern and submit its opinions on problems facing the Com-
munity in all fields relating to the life of the Community.
4. In this respect, the Commission would like to express its appreciation of the
Interim Report by the Monetary Committee of 15 January 1969, which it has
just received.
The Commission fully endorses the Committee s general remarks on co-ordination
of economic policies. It also welcomes the remarks in the Report on the improve-
ment and consolidation of prior consultation procedures and on the improvement
of information facilities. It also notes with particular satisfaction that in this
respect the approach adopted in the report has much in common with that of the
Commission s Memorandum to the Council of 5 December 1968.
The Commission has noted that the Monetary Committee intends to study the
question of the range of fluctuation in .exchange rates, to which the Commission
had drawn attention in its Memorandum of February 1968.
It is the Commission s view that extending the range of fluctuation of the exchange
rates of the currencies of member countries would raise serious problems for the
common agricultural policy and for trade relations in the Community, and would
be a threat to the progressive unification of the markets.
The Commission is well aware that the elimination of the ranges of fluctuation
would raise technical difficulties and would restrict the Member States in their
pursuit of an independent monetary policy. However, it does not regard the
technical difficulties as insurmountable; and it feels that the harmonization of
economic and monetary policies in the Community will account to a great extent
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field. The Commission is determined to make clear its views, on all these points
within the Monetary Committee, as the incertainties underlying them makes
detailed study more important than ever.
II. The present state of the COm1Ilunity and its requirements
5. At the present time the Community is an original and complex entity, consisting
of both national and Community elements. The rate of integration has not been
the same in all fields. The particularly rapid expansion of intra-Community
trade (the proportion of exports to other member countries has risen from one
third of total exports in 1957 to nearly half in 1968) has increased the-interdepen-
dence of the member countries. Although this is very advantageous to their
individual growth, at the .same time it renders the business activity and payments
equilibrium of each member country more vulnerable to business fluctuations in
neighbouring EEC countries. While the solution to the problems raised by this
situation does not lie in a single economic policy, for which the necessary political
psychological and economic conditions are not yet fulfilled, it is not to be found
in a mere juxtaposition of independent national policies either.
At the Community s present stage of development, the economic policies' of the
Member States can no longer be considered without reference to the "Community
phenomenon , which has ceased to be a marginal factor. Thus, certain measures
to which the Member States have resorted in the past can no longer be applied in
a customs union. Others are no longer as effective as they were, as some companies
especially those which are active in two or more countries of the Common Market
can often avoid the effects of certain national measures as a result of the develop.,
ment of financial administration techniques and the speed of modern means of
communication. For measures taken in isolation on the national level to be
effective now, they must be more severe than they used to be. They hit harder
the economy of the country which takes them and are more damaging to the eco~
nomies of its partners than before the establishment of the Common Market. Only
concerted action can prevent this and enable the size of the Community to be
properly exploited.
6. This is not surprising. Only those ignorant of the true nature of modern
economies can believe that a multinational Community could be organized solely
on the bases of a customs union for manufactures, a common agricultural policy,
and some measures of harmonization, notably in the tax field.
The free movement of goods and services in a customs union in the 20th century
has only very little in common with the regional free trade of the second half of
the 19th century. The developed economies, which now form ,a customs union
are strongly influenced and guided by the economic policies of the individual
States and by the action of large units, which develop their own strategy; there is
a danger that incompatibility between these policies and between these strategies
will become a threat to the existence of the customs union.
With regard to the common agricultural policy, experience has shown that its
implications go beyond the primary sector alone and affect such things as the
general level of prices, public finance, and currency exchange relations between
Member States.
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show clearly that there can be no lasting harmonization of indirect taxation unless
economic policies are better co-ordinated to reduce imbalances.
7. Therefore the Community cannot stop at the point which it has now reached.
Either, under the pressure of diverging forces ,which are already apparent, it will
paradoxically  allow its unity to slacken at the very time when the tariff
union has been achieved after much effort, and when the upsurge in technological
progress is steadily enhancing the benefits of a large single market; or, by achieving
sufficient alignment of the national economic policies within the existing institu-
tions, the Community will consolidate and develop the results obtained so far to
the benefit of all the member countries, with a view to faster growth and the more
efficient allocation of available economic resources.
Thus, the Community has a choice of vital importance to make, and it must lose
no time in tackling the problem if it is to avail itself of opportunities remaining
open before serious instability sets in and forces undesirable solutions on it.
The convergence of the member countries' medium- term aims  is  of prime importance.
8. When it submitted the draft for the First Medium-term Economic Policy
Programme to the Council, the EEC Commission drew attention to the existence
of "gaps and inconsistencies" in national projections and the need to "press ahead
with the efforts that are needed if the future is to be better prepared". Although
certain technical and political difficulties remain, it is now possible to fix more
precisely the degree of convergence which the general guidelines of the member
. countries' medium-term policies must comply with to ensure mutual compatibility.
The main medium-term objectives which the member countries should work out
together concern production and employment growth rates, prices, the current
accounts and the equilibrium of the overall balance of payments. These basic
objectives are closely interrelated and should be settled simultaneously.
9. With regard to production and employment growth rates, the differences in
growth potential between the member countries preclude the fixing of the same
objectives for all, and suggest that for each country objectives should be sought
which take into account its own potential and those of its partners, which ensure
better use of productive resources throughout the Community, and which maintain
the relative balances between the member countries. In this case, each member
country could achieve faster growth than if growth were determined as a function
of purely domestic factors.
As far as prices are concerned, substantial disparities between medium-term guide~
lines are likely to cause serious imbalances in the Common Market. In this field
there is less room for disparities than in that of growth. Without insisting on
strict uniformity, which the differences in the economic structures and the social
situations do not allow, a limit should be fixed for each member country beyond
which prices should not be allowed to rise, taking into account intra-Community
relations and the Community s relations with the rest of the world.
Finally, for the current account and the overall balance of payments, as for prices
(and for the same reasons), the member countries should work our objectives
involving incompatibilities neither within the Community nor in its relations with
outside.
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will not remove the need for the member countries to monitor economic trends
carefully. Uncertainties in diagnosing and forecasting, the difficulty of achieving
exactly the right economic policy "mix , and unforeseeable accidents resulting
from internal or external developments necessitate an annual review of the condi-
tions governing the achievement of the proposed objectives, so that the policies of
the Member States may be adjusted if necessary.
11. Concerted agreement on the Member States medium-termguide1ines win not
be successful unless the States pursue joint short-term economic policies related to
. these guidelines. Here again, this does not mean adopting identical policies in
every member country, but ensuring that the policies are sufficiently mutually
consistent when studied at the level of the Community as a whole to prevent the
development of the various economies departing from the guidelines laid down for
the medium term.
There is a need, therefore, to increase the co-ordination of current economic and
financial policies to forestall short-term i!nbalances early enough and under the
most favourable conditions for all the Member States, and to combat them as
effectively as possible should the need arise. In a multi-national area which is
moving towards integration and whose tariff policy towards non-member countries
is quite moderate, it is much more important to forestall imbalances than in 
national economy having no close links with outside. It is in the common interest
to avoid or to correct an imbalance as quickly as possible, even if it is limited to
only one country, such is the risk of it having a contagious effect on the whole
Community. It is also advisable to discuss jointly the steps to be taken to make
sufficient allowance for reciprocal influences, and to prevent the policies which
are adopted from thwarting each other or setting off chain reactions. Recent
experience shows that certain Community countries have too often relied. on eco-
nomic revival in another member country to be the main stimulant to their own
expansion; it also shows that too Iowan estimate of the rate of growth in one
Member State can affect the policies of other Member States.
12. Even if the co-ordination proposed in this Memorandum worked effectively,
it would not preclude unforeseen accidents. No Community Member State is
immune to such occurrences, which could quickly jeopardize its external financial
position.
In such circumstances, there is a serious risk for the Community that the State
affected will resort to unilateral safeguard measures. Steps of this kind should
be avoided, not only because of the growth losses which they inflict on the Com-
munity as a whole, but also because they upset the production, sales and invest-
ment plans of firms in the member countries, and because they shake confidence in
the irreversibility of progress towards a single market for goods, services and
factors of production.
In this respect, there is no doubt that procedures for consultation and joint action
are necessary, but they are not enough. The Commission believes that is indis-
pensable for a Member State in difficulty to be able to obtain from its partners
in the Community, at the crucial moment and without delay, the funds which will
help it to cope with its difficulties without imperilling the operation of the Common
Market. These facilities will not be enough in themselves to correct the imbalance
but it will allow the country receiving it to take the necessary steps under better
conditions.
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the failure of the Community to take an interest in these problems in recent years.
It also seems that the size of the reserves of the member countries has led them to
think that they could each cope with a disequilibrium by drawing on their gold
and currency reserves, and to some this seemed likely to favour a better distribution
of international monetary reserves. But experience has shown that the surplus
position in any member country can change radically in short periods, that a
country s reserves can dwindle very quickly, and that the policies which have to
be introduced to stem the loss of reserves and then restore them to a more satisfac-
tory level affect freedom of transactions and the rate of growth in both country
with the imbalance and the Community as a whole.
14. The' Treaty makes  specific provision in Article 108 for "mutual assistance
between Member States. No use was made of this facility when a balance of
payments crisis affected a member country a few years ago. It was applied more
recently after clumsy and complex procedures; but its main aspect was not mone~
tary or financial; and it was not able to prevent the application of safeguard
measures.
In the light of recent developments, the Commission considers it desirable to set
up machinery in the Community for monetary co-operation which would operate
as part of the medium and short-term economic policy objectives drawn up jointly
and whose purpose would be to prevent imbalances becoming worse rather than
to remedy the effects of crises once they had broken out.
15. It may be inquired whether it is necessary to set up such machinery, considering
that there already exists international machinery for monetary co-operation such
as the network of bilateral short-term facilities between the central banks of the
Community and non-member countries. . It should be observed that the arrange-
ments available under the international systems have so far not been successful in
warding off crises. There is also reason to believe that any improvements which
may be made to them are not likely to be completely successful without effective
co-ordination  pf  the economic policies of the countries taking part.
In the view of the Commission, the establishment of Community machinery is
justified by the fact that the Member States are linked together by a customs
union and by common or co-ordinated economic policies: it is therefore reasonable
that these States, considering their obligations to each other and the advances
advocated in co-ordinating their economic policies, should make th~ necessary
arrangements for granting each other mutual support within their association.
The Community as such should, by virtue of its very existence, be the first multi-
national body to be informed of the problems of a Member State and to come to
its aid in certain conditions.
There is nothing to prevent the Community s own machinery being linked to the
existing machinery for international monetary co-operation, and Community
action forming part of international action, if necessary. The argument that
recent experience shows that the amount of resources to be mobilized is more than
the Community countries alone can find is unconvincing. Firstly, the six countries
have large reserves. Secondly, the very large amounts needed to cope with recent
crises were needed because cure is always more difficult than prevention. Pre-
ventive action would not require such large repeated aids as those which have had
to be granted in certain cases.
S. 3 - 1969It should also be noted that if external circumstances were to lead to the intro-
duction of special exchange relations between the currencies of member countries
it would be necessary to set up Community machinery.
This machinery should be ready for prompt use so that the Member State which
used it could take the appropriate economic policy measures whilst maintaining
freedom of exchange in the Community. It should be available for use whenever
and as soon as the situation calls for it.
Finally, care should be taken to ensure that the machinery does not encourage
the authorities to choose the easy way out when tackling problems. It should not
only forrn part of a clearly-defined system of co-ordinating the economic policies
as described above, but should also be adaptable, so that the necessary adjustment
procedure would not be deferred.
Ill. Measures needed
As recalled in Chapter I, the Commission has on several occasions in the past
suggested what should be done to strengthen the Community s economic and mone-
tary cohesion. It reaffirms, in particular, the content of its Memorandum of
February 1968. However, in its view, the present situation calls for the urgent
concerting of the medium-term economic policies, fuller concerting of the short-
term economic policies, and Community machinery for monetary co-operation.
A. Concerting the medium-term economic policies
16. In accordance with the Council's decision of 15 April 1964, the first two
medium-term economic policy programmes set out the main aims of the economic
policies which the Member States and the institutions of the Community intend
to follow. However, there is still much to be done to "ensure the co-ordination
of the policies , as this decision requires.
Therefore, after consulting the Medium-term . Economic Policy Committee, the
Commission proposes to lay before the Council a Memorandum on the problems
raised for the Community by the prospects in the member countries in the next
few years for the trend of production and employment, prices, the current account
and the overall balance of payments. The Commission suggests that the Council
should consider appropriate decisions in the early Autumn of 1969.
17. After consulting the Medium-term Economic Policy Committee, the Council
should also take the necessary measures for improving the synchronization of the
national programmes and strengthening the links between them. It is regrettable
from the point of view of approximating the economic policies that the periods
chosen by the various member countries for drawing up their medium~term projec-
tions and programmes do not coincide.
18. The Commission also feels that more light should be thrown on the structural
problems facing each country in ' its growth and stability policy, and that the
Medium-term Economic Policy Committee should put in hand preliminary research
to prepare solutions which would be co-ordinated at the Community level in line
with the general lines of the medium-term programmes, and which could, if neces-
sary, use Community facilities created by the Treaties.
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19. The Commission .considers that the most important step to be taken with
regard to the short-term economic policies is the tightening-up and the more effective
application of consultation procedures prior to the final adoption of economic
measures planned by the Member States.
20. Such consultations have already taken place in the Monetary Committee, in
accordance with the Council's decision of 8 May 1964 on co-operation between
Member States in international monetary relations. The declaration of 8 May 1964
by the representatives of the Governments of the Member States provides for such
consultations prior to any modification in the exchange parities of one or more
Member States. Such consultations are also instituted by the Council's decision
of 8 May 1964 on co-operation between the Central Banks of the Member States.
21. In accordance with the Council's decision of 4 March 1960 on the co-ordination
of. the short-term economic policies of the Member States, the Governments of the
Member States are obliged to inform the Commission of the main features of any
of their plans that are likely to affect the short-term economic situation of the
Member States. The implementation of the Council's decision would allow
Community consultation procedures to be instituted swiftly.
Hitherto, prior consultations on internal economic and financial policy measures
have not always taken place in good time. They must therefore be made more
systematic in the various Committees set up for this purpose by the Treaty and by
the special decisions taken by the Council in 1960 and 1964 (Monetary Committee
Short-term Economic Policy Committee, Budget Policy Committee, Committee of
Governors of Central Banks). The Commission has noted that "the Monetary
Committee intends to devote the first item on its agenda at each meeting to a discus-
sion of problems and prospects in monetary and economic policy. This discussion
which will be based on fuller and more rapid information, will. be opened by either
a representative of a State or the Commission
There is a particular need for the States' draft- budgets to be  discussed in future
not merely in the Budget Policy Committee  as at present  but at a meeting
between ministers responsible for economic policy and financial policy. This
meeting would be limited to the general aspects of the drafts, that is, the trend
of the very large expenditure and revenue items, and the impact of this on economic
growth and stability, calculated with particular reference to medium-term objectives.
The Budget Policy Committee could collect the technical data required for the work
of the ministers concerned.
To secure the introduction of the co-ordination procedures referred to above, the
Commission recommends that the Council adopt a decision, on the lines of that
of 8 May 1964 on international monetary relations, which would stipulate compulsory
prior consultations in short-term economic policy (see the annexed draft decision).
22. To facilitate the co-ordination of the short-term economic policies, the Com-
mission believes that the exchange of information on the trelld of the economic
situation in the Member States should be improved, and this will entail uninterrupted
progress in regard to statistics, and increased efforts in methods of analysis. In
this respect, the Commission draws attention to the Council's Recommendation
of 28 July 1966 on the adoption of certain measures to improve statistics on current
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plementation  of  this recommendation and, after consulting the Short-term Economic
Policy Committee and the Monetary Committee, will propose measures for speeding
up work in this field.
23. The co-ordination  of  the economic,policies  of  the Member States, and particularly
the correction at the right moment  of  deviations from the guiding lines laid down
for development, would be made much easier by the introduction  of  a system 
early warning indicators. These should be selected in such a way as to reveal as
swiftly as possible the danger  of  significant deviations from the basic objectives.
As soon as these indicators rose above a certain level , an examination  of  the situa-
tion in the country concerned would have to be put in hand at Community level.
Such a system was set up last year on an experimental basis, and there was close
cooperation between the Commission, the Monetary Committee, and the Short-term
Economic Policy Committee. The experiments carried out in this field are to 
put to good use as soon as possible. 
C. Community machinery for monetary co-operation
24. The machinery which the Commission wishes to see set up should ensure short-
term monetary support and allow medium-term financial assistance for a Member
State. For this purpose, an agreement would be concluded between the member
countri~s to set up a system which would work as follows:
25. Short-term monetary support
(i) Each participant country would undertake to make available to the others
funds not exceeding a given ceiling;
(ii) An agent could be appointed for the technical implementation  of  the provisions
of  the agreement; 1 
(iii) Any participant country could activate the system by simply applying to
the other countries taking part in the agreement; the amount  of  each participant's
debt  to  the others following the application  of  the system would not be ~llowed
to exceed a certain ceiling;
(iv) The ceilings for amounts committed and borrowed would be fixed by agreement
between the participants;
(v) Any sum applied for by a participant country would be financed by the others
in proportion to each country s share in the total amount committed or still available
less the ceiling  of  the commitments  of  the deficit country. However, at the req~est
of  one  of  the participant countries, the agent , with the agreement  of  the others and
within the limits  of  each one s commitment ceiling, could alter the proportions
fixed;
(vi) A participant country could not be obliged to contribute to a financing opera-
tion within the system if he were himself in debt with the system;
1 An ad  hoc  agreement could be concluded for this purpose with te BIS.
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possible by consultation in the appropriate Community bodies. The purpose
of this consultation would be to determine, in the light of an examination of the
situation in the country aided, the measures called for by this situation from both
the country concerned and the other member countries. Failing an agreement
on the steps to be taken by the deficit country, this country may not be indebted to
the system for more than three months. If agreement is reached, the short-term
aid could be renewed for a fixed period or medium-term financial assistance could
be granted, according to the situation in the deficit country.
26. Medium-term financial assistance
(i) If the examination procedure set in motion by use of the system under the condi-
tions set out in Paragraph 25 above were to lead subsequently to the conclusion
that the situation in the country in question required a medium-term loan, the
Commission would recommend the Council after consulting the Monetary
Committee, to grant such a loan.
(ii) The conditions under which this medium-term assistance would be granted
would be determined by the resources which could be mobilized in the medium
term from more extensive sources than the EEC, and by other circumstances.
(iii) Considering among other things the terms of sub-paragraph b) above, it is
not necessary to stipulate ceilings for borrowing, as it is for the machinery described
in Paragraph 25. It would, however, be advisable to establish ceilings for commit-
ments contributed to the operation of this machinery, and these ceilings would be
valid for a limited period and subject to revision.
27. The general outlines of this machinery, which have just been described, are in
accordance with the principles which th~ Commission fellows in the monetary field:
1) A close link should be established between a stronger co-ordination of the
economic policies and the implementation of Community machinery for monetary
co-operation.
2) At the Community s present stage of development, monetary co-operation
between Member States needs to be consolidated on the lines indicated in the Treaty
of Rome.
3) The machinery for Community monetary co-operation is not a substitute for
machinery for international monetary co-operation, but, in the form in which it is
designed, it can fit into the international machinery without difficulty. In
particular, it in no way affects the member countries' obligations to international
monetary institutes.
28. Finally, the Commission points out that in studying the problems facing the
Community in the economic and monetary fields, and in seeking solutions to these
problems, it has taken into consideration the possibilities of the Community being
enlarged.
The proposals submitted by the Commission would not impede on enlargement
of the Community, and therefore could not be considered undesirable in this respect.
The concerting of the economic policies, consultation procedures, and machinery
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in any case be even more necessary to an enlarged Community than to a Community
of Six.
Conclusion
The Commission asks the Council to:
(i) Hold a discussion at the beginning of Autumn 1969 on the prospects in the
member countries in the next few years for the trend of production, employment
prices, the equilibrium of the balance of current payments and the equilibrium of the overall balance of payments. 
(ii) Adopt a decision, the draft of which is annexed to this memorandum, on
consultations over short-term economic policy. 
(iii) Decide before the end of the transitional period to set up machinery for
qlOnetary co-operation in the EEC along the lines indicated above.
The Commission hopes that when the Council examines these proposals it  will  bear
in mind the lessons learnt from recent events, and the ever more inexorable progress
of the ComJ1lunity.
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DRAFT DECISION BY THE COUNCIL ON THE CO-ORDINATION
OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICIES  OF  THE MEMBER STATES
THE  COUNCIL
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,
particularly Article 105, paragraph 1, and the first sub-section  of  Article 145;
Having regard to the recommendation by the Commission;
Considering that, owing to the increasing interpenetration  of  the economies  of  the
Member States, it is necessary to secure a close co-ordination  of  their internal
and external current economic policies, and that for this purpose it is particularly
important to hold the necessary consultations in good time;
Considering that the current economic policies should take into account the medium-
term economic objectives worked out jointly;
Considering the powers  of  the Monetary Committee, the Short-term Economic
Policy Committee, and the Budget Policy Committee in regard to the economic
policies , as defined by their statutes  or  by the Council's decisions;
Considering that it is necessary to extend and make more systematic the procedure
for consultation prior to the Member States adopting important decisions, measures
and statements on current economic policy, when these could have a significant
influence on the economies  of  the other member countries;
Considering the Monetary Committee s interim report  of  15 January 1969, which
lays down the outlines  of  such a consultation procedure and points out the need
for greater co-ordination between the work  of  the Monetary, Short-term Economic
Policy, and Budget Policy Committees;
Considering that it is necessary to specify the terms  of  this procedure on the basis
of  an Opinion rendered by the Monetary Committee;
DECIDES THAT:
Article 1
Prior consultations shall take place on important decisions, measures and state-
ments by a Member State in the field  of  current economic policy, when these will
affect the economies  of  the other Member States and concern such matters as:
(i) The trend  of  prices, incomes and employment;
(ii) Overall budget policy;
(ill) Tax changes liable to be felt at the frontiers.
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These consultations shall take place in the Monetary Committee, the Sb.ort~term
Economic Policy Committee, and the Budget Policy Committee. The appropriate
procedures shall be specified when the Monetary Committee has rendered an
Opinion.
Article 3
TheMember States shall not adopt the decisions, measures and statements mentioned
above until after the consultations provided for in Article 1, unless circumstances
dictate otherwise.
""\
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